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This article  evaluates  whether  the  South  China  Sea’s  littoral  states  can  cooperatively  manage  the region’s
contested  oil  and  natural  gas  resources.  By examining  historical  intergovernmental  joint  development
agreements  (JDAs),  it argues  that  the  prospects  for  signiﬁcant  hydrocarbon  cooperation  are  slim  under
current political  conditions,  as  rival  states  rarely  establish  such  accords.  Moreover,  creating  JDAs  is insuf-





relations.  Nonetheless,  hydrocarbon  agreements  do have  one  important  positive  impact.  They  prevent
resource-related  militarized  confrontations,  thereby  reducing  the  risk  of  territorial  dispute  escalation.
This  incentive,  alone,  could  prompt  the  South  China  Sea’s  claimant  states  to  negotiate  JDAs  and  third
party  states  to  encourage  these  efforts.
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that oil and gas accords are insufﬁcient to prompt actual jointouth China Sea
. Introduction
Recently, tensions in the South China Sea have escalated. China’s
onstruction of artiﬁcial islands is one source of friction, inspiring
ensure from other littoral states, the United States, and the Perma-
ent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which ruled in July 2016 that
hina’s controversial “nine-dash line” maritime claim lacks merit
1]. However, the region’s most severe militarized confrontation in
he last three years was provoked by another issue: oil and natural
as exploration. In May  2014, China and Vietnam became locked
n a militarized standoff, after China parked an oil rig in waters
ear the contested Paracel Islands. Both countries deployed naval
nd coast guard vessels to the area and ships rammed and turned
ater cannons on one another, sinking a Vietnamese ﬁshing boat
2]. Although the crisis was contained and the oil rig eventually
ithdrew, ownership of the sea’s hydrocarbon resources remains
ncertain. Fears are widespread that competition over oil and gas
eposits could provoke further militarized incidents, which might
scalate into larger conﬂicts.
However, hydrocarbon competition could also encourage inter-
ational cooperation. In the aftermath of the rig crisis, Chinese
nd Vietnamese ofﬁcials held discussions on joint development of
he South China Sea’s oil and gas resources [3]. This initiative was
onsistent with a broader Chinese foreign policy, of shelving terri-
orial disputes in order to proceed with resource exploration and
E-mail address: elmeierd@nps.edu
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.014
214-6296/Published by Elsevier Ltd.development.1 Observers have also endorsed hydrocarbon coop-
eration as a means of exploiting the South China Sea’s resources
while sovereignty disagreements continue [4–6]. Some commenta-
tors suggest that collaborative management of oil and gas resources
could encourage cooperation on other contentious issues in the
South China Sea dispute, including claimant countries’ broader
disagreement over political sovereignty (for example, [7]:xvi;
[8]:178).
This article evaluates the viability of such proposals by exam-
ining historical intergovernmental agreements on oil and gas
cooperation. Focusing on joint development agreements (JDAs)
between rivals, it ﬁnds that the prospects for such accords in the
South China Sea are limited; rival states rarely create JDAs. How-
ever, on the few occasions that rivals have established cooperative
hydrocarbon agreements, the accords have had one signiﬁcant pos-
itive effect. They have deterred further militarized confrontations
over oil and gas resources. JDAs would therefore reduce the risk
of territorial dispute escalation in the South China Sea by making
resource disagreements less conﬂictual.
Unfortunately, cooperative hydrocarbon agreements between
rivals have few other positive effects. The historical analysis ﬁndsdevelopment of hydrocarbon resources or improvements in rivals’
broader relations. Instead, for states to jointly develop oil and
1 This policy is outlined in a 2011 White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Development,”
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/bps/t944141.htm.
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as resources, political reconciliation must precede or accompany
ydrocarbon accords. Despite this limitation, the South China Sea’s
laimant states may  ﬁnd the prospect of deterring future oil and
as-related confrontations sufﬁciently appealing to pursue coop-
rative agreements. The article’s ﬁnal section identiﬁes strategies
hat they and third party states can adopt to facilitate the creation
f JDAs.
. The South China Sea dispute
At present, six countries have issued formal claims to portions
f the South China Sea: Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines,
aiwan, and Vietnam.2 However, the dispute began at least eighty
ears ago, with Sino–French disagreements over ownership of the
aracel Islands. The territorial contest provoked signiﬁcant mili-
arized confrontations between China and Vietnam in 1974 and
988. Yet, it was not until the 1990s that the dispute became a
ersistent source of tension between many of the region’s littoral
tates. In part, this escalation was due to China’s growing level of
nterest and activity in the South China Sea, as the state attempted
o develop its blue water navy and intensiﬁed its hunt for hydro-
arbon resources, after becoming a net oil importer in 1993. The
nited States also became more attuned to the dispute during this
ime period, due to concerns about China’s emerging challenge to
.S. naval superiority in the western Paciﬁc and the threat that it
osed to the Philippines, a U.S. ally.
Hydrocarbon resources are one issue at stake in the South China
ea dispute. All claimant states would like to increase the amount of
il and gas resources under their control. However, estimates of the
egion’s hydrocarbon endowments vary. China has issued the most
ptimistic assessments, claiming that the sea contains 125 billion
arrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources.
n contrast the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) is far more
onservative, estimating that the sea contains 11 billion barrels of
il and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves [9].3 More-
ver, many of the hydrocarbon deposits in contested portions of the
outh China Sea are situated in deep water, making them techni-
ally challenging and expensive to exploit. Most analysts therefore
onclude that oil and gas competition is not the dominant fac-
or driving the South China Sea dispute. Other issues at stake in
he contest include the security of sea lanes, freedom of naviga-
ion, positional rivalry between the United States and China, and
ompetition over ﬁsheries.
Although far from the only issue involved in the South China
ea contest, oil and gas resources are a source of signiﬁcant fric-
ion. A number of militarized incidents, culminating in the 2014
ino–Vietnamese rig confrontation, have been provoked by hydro-
arbon exploration [10]. Concern about further oil and gas-related
ontention is widespread (for example, [11]).4 Yet, some parties to
he dispute hope that, rather than inspiring conﬂict, hydrocarbon
esources will be a catalyst for interstate cooperation. Former Tai-
anese President Ma  Ying-jeou [12], for example, has pushed for
oint development of the South China Sea’s oil and gas, proposing
hat claimant states “shift the focus from settling territorial dis-
utes to jointly developing resources.” Malaysia’s Prime Minister,
ajib Razak, has also endorsed this approach [13].
2 Indonesia claims waters around the Natuna Islands, but is not considered a South
hina Sea claimant.
3 The EIA [9] ﬁgures are for proved and probable reserves. In addition, the agency
eports that the sea may 5–22 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 70–290 trillion
ubic feet of undiscovered gas.
4 Other oil-related militarized incidents include confrontations between China
nd  Vietnam over the Wan’an Bei-21 ﬁeld during the 1990s.cial Science 24 (2017) 65–70
Proponents of hydrocarbon cooperation have two  central goals.
First, they aspire to develop oil and gas resources that would
otherwise be inaccessible, due to ongoing territorial disputes.
Second, some of them hope that hydrocarbon collaboration will
improve states’ broader relations by acting as a conﬁdence build-
ing measure.5 Oil and gas cooperation appears to be a plausible
starting point for collaboration because, unlike political authority
or control over sea lanes of communication, hydrocarbon deposits
can be divided, creating joint gains. As Ma  [12] put it: “although
sovereignty cannot be divided, resources can still be shared.” In
addition, hydrocarbon cooperation is easier than ﬁsheries cooper-
ation because oil and gas reservoirs, unlike ﬁsh stocks, do not move.
Moreover, numerous cooperative intergovernmental hydrocarbon
agreements have been established globally, making the strategy
appear viable.
However, in the South China Sea, hydrocarbon cooperation has
a rocky history. In 2005, three of the claimant states’ national
oil companies (NOCs)—the Chinese National Offshore Oil  Cor-
poration (CNOOC), the Philippine National Oil Company, and
PetroVietnam—established the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking
(JMSU): an agreement that committed the companies to collabora-
tive seismic surveying of approximately 140,000 km2 of maritime
territory around the Spratly Islands.6 Initially, operations pro-
ceeded smoothly. However, the accord collapsed in 2008, after an
outpouring of popular resistance in the Philippines [14,15]. Since
then, popular opposition to cooperation with China has increased,
making joint development of the South China Sea’s resources
even more challenging. Since 2008, the only claimant states that
have made further progress in hydrocarbon cooperation are Brunei
and Malaysia, who  announced in August 2015 that their NOCs,
PetroleumBrunei and Petronas, would jointly develop two oil ﬁelds
along their maritime boundary. Signiﬁcantly, Brunei and Malaysia
have much friendlier relations than many of the South China Sea’s
claimant states.
Numerous authors have evaluated the viability of more exten-
sive hydrocarbon collaboration in the South China Sea [6,16–19].
However, these analyses have limited predictive power because
they tend to assess the South China Sea case in isolation. In con-
trast, the following analysis examines comparable historical cases
of oil and gas cooperation in order to gain greater purchase on the
questions of whether further hydrocarbon collaboration is possible
in the South China Sea and its likely effects.
3. Why  cooperate?
Countries’ incentives to cooperatively manage hydrocarbon
resources arise from the mismatch between physical and political
geography. Oil and gas reservoirs frequently traverse international
boundaries or are located in areas where borders have not yet been
established. Multiple states can therefore lay claim to these shared
deposits and must decide how to manage them. Under these cir-
cumstances, each claimant states has three basic choices; it can
leave the resources undeveloped, exploit them unilaterally, or col-
laborate with other claimant countries to exploit the contested
reservoirs.
Refraining from resource development has obvious limitations;
a state cannot proﬁt from untouched hydrocarbon deposits and
runs the risk of another country siphoning off an entire contested
5 These arguments are consistent with functionalist expectations about the
impacts of economic cooperation on political disputes; for a resource-related sum-
mary of such arguments, see Lowi [35].
6 This was an agreement between companies, not countries, and limited to seismic
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eservoir. However, the second option, unilateral exploitation,
s also problematic. When multiple states extract oil without
oordinating their actions, they increase the risk of a drop in
eservoir pressure, which can render large portions of a hydrocar-
on deposit unrecoverable. Unilateral exploitation also antagonizes
ther claimant states, who may  respond with diplomatic cen-
ure, economic sanctions, or military action. In addition, unilateral
xploiters have difﬁculty attracting investment to develop shared
elds. Oil companies do not want to risk reservoir pressure drops,
ilitarized assaults, and changes in territorial authority. Hence,
hey either refrain from participating in projects in contested areas
r demand advantageous contract terms.
Resource cooperation, the third option, is appealing because
t entails none of these geophysical, political, and economic
isks. Cooperating countries can preserve reservoirs’ geophysical
ntegrity, attract foreign investment, and avoid endangering their
roader bilateral relations, in addition to proﬁting from oil and
as exploitation. States that pursue this strategy usually choose
etween two institutional instruments: unitization and joint devel-
pment. In international unitization accords, governments agree
o collaboratively exploit a shared reservoir, often using a single
perator. In joint development agreements (JDAs), states iden-
ify a geographic zone in which they will cooperatively exploit
ll resource discoveries.7 JDAs are appealing instruments to use
n contested territories, because they enable countries to develop
esources without addressing the thornier question of political
overeignty. JDAs vary in terms of formality, the speciﬁcity of rules
or resource exploration and production, and the size of joint devel-
pment zones (JDZs).
Between 1958 and 2014, states established forty-ﬁve cooper-
tive intergovernmental hydrocarbon agreements.8 Bahrain and
audi Arabia signed the ﬁrst JDA in 1958, to manage the Fasht Abu-
a’fah oil ﬁeld in the Red Sea, and Norway and the United Kingdom
reated the ﬁrst unitization accord in 1976, for the Frigg gas ﬁeld
n the North Sea. By now, cooperative accords have been estab-
ished in all regions of the world. The 2000s were the most active
ecade, in terms of number of agreements signed. Countries are
herefore willing to collaboratively manage oil and gas resources,
hen conditions are favorable.
. Hydrocarbon cooperation between rivals
To determine whether oil and gas cooperation is possible in
he South China Sea, this analysis focuses on a particular sub-
et of historical cases: intergovernmental hydrocarbon agreements
etween rival states. “Strategic rivals” are countries that identify
ach other as “competitive and threatening enemies.”9 Their hos-
ility is based on territorial, positional, and ideological differences
nd they frequently share a history of militarized conﬂict. Most
nternational wars have been fought by rivals, as disagreements
etween them are prone to escalation ([20]:16). In the South China
ea, multiple relationships can be classiﬁed as territorial rivalries:
n particular, those between China and the Philippines and China
nd Vietnam.10 These countries’ hydrocarbon competitions pose
he greatest threat to international security and, consequently, rep-
esent the most tantalizing prospects for oil and gas cooperation.
7 Unitization is primarily employed to manage discovered reservoirs that cross
stablished international boundaries. In contrast, joint development is predomi-
antly used in areas where international boundaries have not yet been delimited
nd resources are prospective, rather than proved.
8 A full list of accords is available from the author.
9 Deﬁnition and rivalry codings are from Thompson and Dreyer [20].
10 Since October 2016, relations between China and the Philippines have begun
o thaw, due to the Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte’s, softer position towards
hina.cial Science 24 (2017) 65–70 67
Unfortunately, rivals are likely to have difﬁculty cooperating.
Since their relationships are highly competitive and characterized
by mutual mistrust, leaders of rival states are very concerned about
cheating. They also tend to view international cooperation as a
zero-sum game, rather than an opportunity for joint beneﬁts [21].
These propensities impede interstate bargaining, which constrains
rivals’ ability to reach collaborative accords. Hydrocarbon cooper-
ation among rivals is especially unlikely, because oil is a strategic
resource; reapportionment could upset a ﬁnely tuned international
balance of power. In addition, leaders of rival states are constrained
by domestic politics [22]. Joint resource development can be inter-
preted as “sharing with the enemy,” provoking intense popular
opposition. Rivals are therefore least-likely cases for hydrocarbon
cooperation. Oil and gas accords between these countries should
be rare and limited in scope.
The historical record bears out these expectations. Of the
forty-ﬁve unitization and joint development agreements created
between 1958 and 2014, only ﬁve were signed by strategic rivals:
China and Japan (2008), Argentina and the United Kingdom (1995),
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (2004), Guinea-Bissau and Senegal
(1993), and North and South Yemen (1988). All ﬁve of these accords
were informal JDAs; the agreements did not require ratiﬁcation by
state legislatures and contained no enforceable punishments for
noncompliance. In most of them, governments pledged to cooper-
ate in hydrocarbon exploration and production, but provided few
detailed rules for resource development.
Although limited in scope, these historical agreements had
one signiﬁcant positive effect. While they were in place, partic-
ipant states did not engage in any oil or gas-related militarized
confrontations.11 Incidents like the Sino–Vietnamese rig clash did
not occur. This restraint indicates that hydrocarbon agreements
between rivals can moderate international resource competition,
most likely by discouraging unilateral exploitation of contested oil
and gas reservoirs. Moreover, by relieving one source of interstate
animosity, hydrocarbon accords reduce the risk of dispute esca-
lation. Rivals may  still ﬁght over other issues. However, oil and
gas resources are no longer a provocation. JDAs make hydrocarbon
disagreements less conﬂictual.
Yet, historical JDAs between rivals have few other indepen-
dent positive impacts. Of the ﬁve agreements, only two—between
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal and North and South Yemen—were
followed by actual joint development of contested resources.
Importantly, in these two cases, governments committed them-
selves to political reconciliation prior to or concomitant with oil and
gas agreements. Thus, rather than inspiring improvements in rivals’
broader relations, JDAs depended on it. Alone, JDAs only prevent
hydrocarbon-related confrontations.
To explore these ﬁndings in greater detail, the following sec-
tions present the ﬁve historical JDAs between rivals in turn. Each
case study identiﬁes the source of participants’ bilateral rivalry,
the process that led to their JDA, and the agreement’s effects. The
presentation begins with the three cases that did not result in co-
development of hydrocarbon resources and concludes with the two
that did.
4.1. China–Japan (2008)
After falling dormant after World War  II, China and Japan’s
rivalry revived in the 1990s. One of the issues contributing to its
intensiﬁcation was China’s growing power. Another was  the states’
escalating competition for territorial authority in the East China
Sea. Sovereignty in the region has resource implications; the sea
11 “Militarized confrontations” are identiﬁed using the Militarized Interstate Dis-
pute (MID) dataset [36].



























































JDA, indicates that hydrocarbon cooperation was not the cause of
the broader improvement in bilateral relations. Rather, it was  one,
simultaneous component of a larger reconciliation. This shift, from8 E. Meierding / Energy Researc
ontains valuable natural gas deposits. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chi-
ese oil companies moved increasingly further offshore, to explore
or and develop these reservoirs.
Bilateral tensions in the East China Sea came to a head in 2003,
hen Chinese operators set up a production platform above the
hunxiao gas ﬁeld, less than two kilometers from the maritime
edian line between China and Japan. Japanese authorities insisted
hat the companies share data on the ﬁeld in order to ensure that
hey were not siphoning off Japanese reserves. When Chinese ofﬁ-
ials refused these demands, Japan launched its own exploration
rojects, intensifying the dispute. In November 2004, a Han class
ubmarine was identiﬁed in Japanese waters and, in January 2005,
wo Chinese destroyers moved into the Chunxiao area [23–25].
hese operations appeared to conﬁrm popular suspicions: that
ydrocarbon competition would trigger militarized conﬂict.
However, during the same period, the two countries were
ttempting to reach an agreement on resource cooperation. In
ctober 2004, they launched the “Japan–China Consultations Con-
erning the East China Sea and Other Matters.” Twelve rounds of
ilateral discussions culminated in the Principled Consensus on the
ast China Sea Issue (2008). The agreement created a small JDZ
n the middle of the sea and permitted Japanese participation in
evelopment of the Chunxiao ﬁeld.
Since the agreement was signed, no further militarized incidents
ave occurred around the East China Sea’s gas ﬁelds. However,
he JDA has not helped improve broader Sino–Japanese rela-
ions. Instead, the states’ territorial rivalry has intensiﬁed, due
o confrontations near the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 450
ilometers southwest of China and Japan’s JDZ. In September 2010,
ollowing a confrontation near the islands, Chinese ofﬁcials can-
elled the second round of talks on implementing the Principled
onsensus [26]. As a result, the accord has not resulted in any col-
aborative resource development. Instead, China has continued to
nilaterally develop gas resources on its side of the median line,
ithout Japanese participation.
.2. Argentina–United Kingdom (1995)
Anglo–Argentine hydrocarbon cooperation followed a similar
rajectory to China and Japan’s. The states’ rivalry began in 1965,
hen their territorial dispute over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands
scalated. It intensiﬁed with the Falklands War  (1982). How-
ver, when Argentina’s democratically elected Menem government
ame to power in 1989, leaders were eager to repair the bilateral
elationship. In February 1990, Argentina and the United Kingdom
greed to restore diplomatic relations and put the topic of island
overeignty aside in order to proceed with cooperation on other
ssues [27]. In September 1995, the states established the Joint Dec-
aration on Cooperation Over Offshore Activities in the South West
tlantic. This agreement created the Special Area: a JDZ southwest
f the islands.
While the accord was in place, Argentina and the United King-
om did not engage in any resource-related militarized incidents.
owever, the JDA did not result in actual joint development of
il resources. Instead, two weeks after the Joint Declaration was
igned, the Falkland Islands Government embarked upon unilat-
ral resource development, by inviting bids for oil exploration in
erritories outside of the Special Area. Over the next ﬁve years, no
xploration occurred in the states’ JDZ and, in July 2000, the United
ingdom and Argentina suspended meetings of the South West
tlantic Hydrocarbons Commission, the organization created to
anage the Joint Declaration, in order “to allow time for reﬂection”
n participants’ “divergent interpretations” of the accord [28]. Thus,
ather than improving bilateral relations, the Anglo–Argentine JDA
as a source of friction. In March 2007, after bilateral relations dete-cial Science 24 (2017) 65–70
riorated further, Argentina formally withdrew from the accord. No
joint resource development was ever conducted in the Special Area.
4.3. Equatorial Guinea–Gabon (2004)
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have been rivals since the 1970s,
due to their disagreement over island and maritime authority in
resource-rich Corisco Bay, located at the terminus of their land
boundary. In February 2003, the countries’ dispute intensiﬁed,
when Gabon’s defense minister landed on a contested island and
reiterated his state’s territorial claims. Equatorial Guinea protested
and the incident seemed poised for escalation. However, in July
2004, following United Nations mediation, the two states signed
a Memorandum of Understanding on oil and gas development in
Corisco Bay. They also agreed to determine their maritime bound-
ary and pursue a settlement of their territorial dispute [29,30].
Since the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, its
effects have been similar to those of the Anglo–Argentine and
Sino–Japanese JDAs. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have not
engaged in any oil and gas-related militarized confrontations. How-
ever, the memorandum has not been followed by actual joint
development of oil and gas resources or by broader improvements
in bilateral relations. The states have not delimited their boundary
and remain rivals.
4.4. Guinea-Bissau–Senegal (1993)
In the ﬁnal two cases, participant states have jointly developed
hydrocarbon resources, as well as avoided militarized incidents,
since creating their JDAs. The key factor enabling this more expan-
sive cooperation was the timing of political reconciliation. In these
two cases, rivals signiﬁcantly improved their broader relations
prior to or concomitant with their hydrocarbon accords. Political
reconciliation facilitated hydrocarbon cooperation, rather than the
other way around.
Guinea-Bissau and Senegal’s rivalry, like the previous three
cases, was rooted in a territorial dispute. The contest began in the
1970s, when Guinea-Bissau achieved independence and the states
inherited a boundary disagreement from their former colonizers,
Portugal and France. In 1977, the countries initiated negotiations to
resolve the issue. When these failed to produce a mutually accept-
able settlement, the states turned to international adjudication. In
1989, an Arbitral Tribunal ruled that a 1960 Franco–Portuguese
agreement had established the countries’ maritime boundary.
Guinea-Bissau rejected the ruling and opened a case before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), initiating the states’ rivalry ([31];
[20]:227–28).
The legal proceedings before the ICJ were acrimonious. How-
ever, the countries subsequently settled their dispute through
further negotiations. In 1993, they created the Management and
Cooperation Agreement,  which established a JDZ for ﬁsheries and
hydrocarbon resources in a large, triangular area straddling the
1960 maritime boundary. The accord ofﬁcially resolved the states’
territorial disagreement, which ended their rivalry. The timing of
rivalry termination, concomitant with Guinea-Bissau and Senegal’srivalry to amity, facilitated the creation of Guinea-Bissau and Sene-
gal’s second JDA, in 1995, and actual joint development of shared
oil deposits. The countries began issuing exploration permits for
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onducted seismic surveys and exploratory drilling in the area.12
he states have also refrained from oil and gas-related militarized
onfrontations, since establishing their ﬁrst JDA.
.5. North and South Yemen (1988)
The rivalry between North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic)
nd South Yemen (the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen)
egan in 1967, when the latter achieved independence from the
nited Kingdom.13 In this case, the sources of rivalry were primarily
deological, rather than territorial. South Yemen’s Marxist govern-
ent challenged the legitimacy of the North Yemeni regime and
ach state supported dissident groups in the other. The countries
lso engaged in border clashes, which increased in the late 1970s
[20]:172). Nonetheless, in November 1988, the two  Yemens signed
 JDA: the Agreement for the Exploitation of (and Investment in) the
oint Area Between the Two Sectors of Yemen (also known as the Aden
greement). The states uniﬁed 18 months later, in May  1990.
The timing of these developments suggests that hydrocarbon
ooperation precipitated political change. However, a closer exam-
nation of the case reveals that North and South Yemen were ﬁrmly
ommitted to uniﬁcation, prior to establishing the Aden Agreement.
n the Taiz Agreement,  signed in April 1988, seven months before the
DA, the two Yemens pledged to “continue towards. . .step-by-step
euniﬁcation through peaceful and democratic means.” The Taiz
greement also referred to existing organizations and commissions
n uniﬁcation and called for the creation of a timetable to draft a
ew constitution for the uniﬁed state ([32]:654). The Yemens’ JDA
as therefore a product of political reconciliation, not its cause.
t was followed by actual joint development of oil resources, by
he uniﬁed Yemeni state. The two states did not engage in further,
esource-related militarized confrontations, as they had ceased to
e independent political entities.
. Prospects of hydrocarbon cooperation in the South
hina Sea
As the ﬁve historical cases demonstrate, JDAs between rivals
re rare and have limited independent causal power. On the pos-
tive side, hydrocarbon accords appear to deter resource-related
rises. None of the rivals that established JDAs engaged in oil or gas-
elated militarized confrontations while the agreements were in
lace. However, on the negative side, these accords did not generate
roader improvements in participants’ bilateral relations. Nor did
hey prompt actual joint development of hydrocarbon resources.
nstead, for states to cooperatively exploit oil and gas resources,
ivalry termination had to precede or accompany JDA creation.
These ﬁndings do not bode well for oil and gas cooperation
mongst the South China Sea’s most contentious dyads: China and
ietnam and China and the Philippines. Given the rarity of inter-
overnmental hydrocarbon accords between rivals, these states
re unlikely to establish collaborative agreements, especially now
hat the Permanent Court of Arbitration has delegitimized China’s
aritime claims. There is somewhat more hope for China and
he Philippines, given the recent thaw in bilateral relations, led
y Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte since October 2016 [33].
onetheless, should these claimant states beat the odds and createDAs, the agreements will not lead to actual joint development of
il and gas resources, unless the countries terminate their rivalries
rior to or concomitant with the establishment of their hydrocar-
12 Exploration information is available at the website of the Management and
ooperation Agency Between Senegal and Guinea Bissau. Available at http://agc-
ngb.org/en/.
13 At the time, the People’s Republic of South Yemen.cial Science 24 (2017) 65–70 69
bon accords: a development that remains unlikely, under current
political conditions.
However, while actual joint development of oil and gas
resources may  be out of reach, China, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam may  still want to negotiate JDAs. If the states can establish
agreements, the historical record suggests that these will deter fur-
ther oil and gas-related militarized confrontations. The prospect
of eliminating such crises, and thereby reducing the risk of dis-
pute escalation, may  be sufﬁciently enticing for leaders to attempt
to establish hydrocarbon accords. In addition, among the South
China Sea’s less hostile dyads—effectively, any that do not include
China—cooperation is more plausible and may  result in actual joint
development of oil and gas resources. Thus, for all claimant states,
taking a crack at hydrocarbon cooperation is likely to be worth the
effort, as long as they keep their expectations in check.
To facilitate cooperation, rival claimants could take two
main steps. First, they should dampen their hostile rhetoric.
Interstate rivalries are largely a matter of perception: whether
states—including their populations—view each other as threaten-
ing enemies. If governments present themselves as adversaries,
issuing aggressive statements and conducting shows of force,
international tensions increase and the potential for hydrocarbon
cooperation declines. In contrast, if rivals in the region can temper
their actions and rhetoric and moderate their populations’ hostil-
ity, as China and the Philippines have recently done, establishing
JDAs becomes more feasible.
Second, cooperation will become more viable if the South China
Sea’s claimant states are willing to pursue bilateral hydrocar-
bon agreements, rather than a multilateral accord. Historically,
there has never been a multilateral, intergovernmental JDA, even
between friendly countries. Bilateral arrangements are less compli-
cated to negotiate and, consequently, easier to establish. The best
prospects for hydrocarbon cooperation are therefore geographical
areas that are claimed by only two states, rather than those that fall
within the claims of three or more. This restriction will impede the
establishment of JDZs within the Spratly Islands. However, nego-
tiations can address contentious, resource-endowed areas that are
jointly claimed by China and the Philippines or China and Vietnam.
Third party states, including the United States, can also facilitate
JDA creation by supporting neutral parties’ geological exploration
in the South China Sea. One impediment to international bargain-
ing over contested oil and gas resources is incomplete information
about the location and volume of reservoirs; it is difﬁcult for
governments to commit to agreements if they do not know
exactly what they are gaining or giving up. Competing countries
have difﬁculty collecting these data themselves, as the JMSU and
Sino–Vietnamese rig confrontation demonstrate. However, inter-
national expeditions, such as those undertaken by the International
Ocean Discovery Program (IODP) and the United Nations Com-
mittee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources
(CCOP), have greater freedom of movement [34].
None of these strategies is failsafe. It will be difﬁcult for the
South China Sea’s most contentious dyads to create JDAs. More-
over, without broader political reconciliation, these agreements
will not lead to actual joint development of oil and gas resources.
Nor will JDAs improve countries’ political relations. However, they
will remove one source of friction in the South China Sea dispute,
thereby enhancing regional security. This prospect, alone, may  be
worth the effort.
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